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AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SHORE ACTIVITY 






This research examines the use of alternative workweeks to improve productive work at 
naval activities ashore. These activities have limited control over the number of personnel 
assigned by the Bureau Naval Personnel. Attempts to increase productivity must be 
achieved with personnel assigned. Therefore, potential increases in productivity and 
retention must be accomplished through innovative leadership. In order to increase 
productivity from personnel assigned, it is necessary to improve morale and command 
buy-in. This might be accomplished by changing how the Navy Standard Workweek 
(NSW) is executed. This research examines theoretical productivity increases under 
alternative workweeks using the established NSW as a benchmark, as set forth in 
OPNAVINST 1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures.  
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The United States Navy has always sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency 
of personnel. Since 1995 the U.S. Navy has been exploring manning reductions and force 
shaping to balance the budget. Many personnel initiatives have been explored and some 
have succeeded at increasing readiness while decreasing costs. While reductions in 
manning should reduce overall costs, there may be unforeseen long term retention 
expenses. A new approach to increasing efficiency at the organizational level may help 
increase productive work hours, decrease costs, and help to retain more qualified 
personnel.   
In CY 2010 the United States Navy total force, officers and enlisted, end strength, 
was 324,400 members. This is a reduction in end strength of 13 percent, down from 
373,193 when compared to CY 2000. Some of this reduction may be attributed to a 
decrease in the number of U.S. Navy ships. In 2000, the United States had a 318-ship 
Navy, and in 2010 it was a 288-ship Navy. The Navy lost one aircraft carrier, while 
Guided Missile Destroyer’s (DDG) and Guided Missile Cruiser’s (CG) were a wash at 
minus five CG’s and plus five DDG’s, both with very similar crew compliment. The 
Navy shrunk its Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) and Fast-attack Submarine (SSN) fleet by 
six and three, respectively. The Ballistic Missile Submarine’s (SSBN) and Guided 
Missile Submarine’s (SSGN) are in the same category as DDG and CG with a minus four 
plus four tradeoff. The Navy also reduced by 18 the number of amphibious and auxiliary 
ships during that 10 year period. This accounts for roughly a ten percent drop in ships and 
does not directly explain the 13 percent end strength decline. Navy end strength from 
2005 to 2014 has been largely driven by Perform to Serve (PTS) and Enlisted Retention 
Boards (ERB) to shape the force down to 266,021 enlisted personnel. ERB and PTS 
succeeded at shaping the force structure but were not successful at increasing retention in 
undermanned rates. A new approach at balancing the force is needed to ensure the Navy 
maintains its readiness while further reducing cost. (Naval History and Heritage 
Command n.d.) 
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The Navy is also moving to align with civilian workforces, both in pay schedules 
and work life balance. Although the demand on the Navy workforce at sea will never be 
comparable to a civilian job, there are many ways that the Navy can increase work life 
balance at non seagoing commands. The push for recognition of the Alfred P. Sloan 
award and their attempt to be one of the top 500 desired workplaces indicate the Navy’s 
desire to balance work and home life for its service members.    
Efficiency programs that have been tried in the past include the USS Yorktown 
and plans for manning littoral combat ship. These efficiency programs seek to use a 
smaller workforce to complete the tasks usually assigned to a much larger force. The 
USS Yorktown smart ship program sought efficiency through innovation and technology 
to reduce effective crew size. The littoral combat ship is also another example of 
efficiency programs where a smaller ship with a smaller crew complement is capable of 
performing the same duties as a larger ship with a larger crew complement.   These 
concepts are discussed in depth in the background Chapter II. 
Currently, there are no alternative working programs being used to increase 
efficiency for enlisted personnel at shore-based commands. The current system generally 
uses the Navy standard ashore workweek and produces 33.38 hours of productive work 
per week. An in depth discussion of this calculation is given in chapter three. It is 
important to know that the Commanding Officer of each unit has the responsibility to 
apply his assigned personnel in the most efficient manner.   Some Commanding officers 
already use an alternative workweek for civilian personnel with gains seen from its 
implementation. This project seeks to analyze different types of alternative workweeks, 
their feasibility and implementation strategies for shore-based commands.  
A detailed analysis of alternative workweeks and their associated costs or benefits 
is needed prior to implementation. Benefits to an alternative workweek may include a 
decrease in needed work force, an increase in enlisted retention and a more professional 
workforce. Negative impacts of an alternative workweek may include decreased capacity 
for tasks, increased costs to outside organizations and increased costs of implementation. 
Many of these costs and benefits will be similar and there may not be one definitive 
strategy for all commands.  
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II. CURRENT NAVY PRACTICE
A. THE NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK 
Navy manpower requirements are based on mission requirements and are set forth 
in OPNAVINST 1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures. This 
instruction promulgates standard workweeks for shore-based activities as well as 
deployable activities, which serve as the basis for manpower requirements. Commanding 
Officers can choose to utilize these workweek calculations to employ their assigned 
personnel, or to execute an alternate workweek. Commanding Officers generally employ 
the Navy Standard Workweek (NSW) with minor modification.  
OPNAVINST 1000.16K states that an integral part of manpower requirements 
determination is the establishment of standard workweeks. Workweeks for sea duty units 
and detachments are based upon operational requirements under projected wartime 
conditions. Workweeks for ashore units are based on peacetime conditions and are used 
by the CNO in the documentation of manpower requirements. The Navy’s Standard 
Workweeks are key elements in the calculation of Navy manpower requirements. They 
are guidelines for sustained personnel utilization under projected wartime or peacetime 
conditions and are not intended to reflect the limits of personnel endurance. They are for 
planning purposes only and are neither restrictive nor binding on commanders or 
commanding officers in establishing individual command working hours. Daily workload 
intensity is a function of operational requirements; as such, the actual day-to-day 
management of personnel is the responsibility of the commanding officer. Under certain 
circumstances it may become necessary to exceed the standard workweek; however, 
extending working hours on a routine basis could adversely affect life-work matters such 
as morale, retention and safety. As policy such extensions should be avoided. 
Some possible alternative workweek schedules are given in Chapter III and are 
examined on three axes; volume of work completed, flexibility and schedule. Volume of 
work is the most easily calculated metric and will determine gains in productive work 
hours.   Flexibility and scheduling are more qualitative analysis axes, whose assumptions 
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will need to be substantiated with other research. Ultimately, if efficiency programs work 
and decrease costs while utilizing current force structure they should be implemented and 
tested to see what level of return might be produced. 
1. Basic Workweek Considerations 
The nature of Navy work, duty and watch requirements makes it difficult under 
all circumstances to fix work periods on a daily or weekly basis. Averaging techniques 
are, therefore, employed in determining the elements comprising the various workweeks. 
As a result, workweeks are not necessarily an expression of the maximum weekly hours 
that may be expended by an individual in any particular week, but rather regulate the 
average weekly hours that will be expended on a monthly or annual basis. Average 
weekly hours expressed in each Navy Standard Workweek are guidelines for sustained 
personnel utilization. The workweek for activities where accompanying dependents are 
authorized is based on a five-day, 40-hour workweek and is explained in Table 1. 
 
Detailed Description of Navy Standard Workweek 
Aircraft Squadrons –  Military Personnel 
Shore-Based Squadrons (e.g., FRS, HT, and VT) Where Accompanying Dependents  
are Authorized: 
         
Total hours available weekly 
   
40.00 Hrs 
   
         Non-Available Time 
      Training 
   
(1.47) Hrs   
Service Diversion 
   
(1.00) Hrs   
Leave 
   
(2.62) Hrs 
  Holidays 
   
(1.53) Hrs   
Total     
-6.62 
   
         Total Hours Available for Productive Work    33.38 Hrs 
    
Table 1.   Navy Standard Workweek description 
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B. SHORE-BASED MANPOWER 
1. Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Program 
Shore-based manpower requirements are based on the Shore Manpower 
Requirement Determination Program (SMRDP), which is the successor to the Navy 
Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manning Planning System (SHORTSTAMPS), by 
Unit Identification Code (UIC). It is a program that looks to systematically determine the 
manning requirements for all shore activities. SHORTSTAMPS did not work because it 
did not have full coverage of shore activities and was phased out in 1987. SMRDP 
Processes were developed in 1987 in order to increase the utility of manpower 
requirements in daily decision-making across all levels of Navy management and 
leadership. Ultimately the SMRDP is the minimum quantitative and qualitative 
manpower requirements for shore activities. (CNO, Shore Man-power Requirements 
Determination Process 2008) 
SMRDP is a process that provides a systematic means of determining and 
documenting manpower necessary to accomplish an approved activity’s tasking.   The 
processes rely on reviewing, measuring and assessing workload in terms of an activity’s 
Mission, Functions and Tasks (MFTs).   Each shore activity is responsible for developing 
its own MFTs. The largest drawback to the MFT system is that in the determination of 
the MFTs because there is no standardization between squadrons for number and types of 
MFTs.   
2. USS Yorktown (CG-48) 
The U.S. Navy has always been aware that manning (as opposed to manpower) 
was a crucial element to mission success. As such the modern Navy has sought out many 
initiatives to not only reduce the manning required but also improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of those sailors. In 1995, on the heels of a paper distributed by the Naval 
Research Advisory Committee the Navy undertook a radical step in that direction aboard 
the USS Yorktown. (Moore and Hattiangadi 2002)  The goal was to determine if 
manning could be reduced and efficiency maintained using innovation, contemporary 
technology, and a more diversely trained crew. The Yorktown leadership was given 
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extreme latitude in determining how the mission was met. What they came up with was 
in stark contrast to any other ship on the waterfront. The crew was trained on automated 
equipment that reduced the number of required watches and thus freed up manpower to 
be directed elsewhere. Instead of allowing inefficiency to persist the command then 
reduced the number of personnel required on “Duty” in a given 24-hour period. The 
sailors onboard were incentivized to actively seek out qualifications that promised to 
further reduce the duty requirement. Eventually what was observed was a completely 
new type of crew. Watch standers were qualified from every department on the ship. 
Engineering watches were stood by combat systems personnel, technical stations manned 
by supply department sailors and every watch station known and stood by virtually every 
sailor onboard. The result was a reduction of the duty section required on board to just 
what was needed to get the ship underway, using the automated systems, and to combat 
any known damage control issue. Eventually Yorktown would achieve an astounding 12 
duty sections in homeport. This meant that the crew effectively had two days of 24 hour 
duty in a given month which in turn increased moral, reduced leave and special liberty 
request and arguably increased the quality of the crew members in that they held 
numerous cross rated qualifications.  
The leadership sought to further the efficiencies observed in the duty make-up and 
apply them to the workweek as well. They determined that in a standard workday the 
average sailor only worked about three to four hours doing productive work. This 
accounts for a 0730 to 1630 workday in which the first 30 minutes are used for Quarters. 
The following hour was used to disseminate the work to be done and gathering of 
required supplies. The following two hours are utilized for productive output. It is now 
1100 and lunchtime, which took between one and two hours. At 1300 return to the ship 
with another 45 minutes to an hour to collect tools and begin work. Two hours there, and 
now it is 1600 and time for “sweepers” and a 1630 knock off.   
Once the leadership understood how inefficiently they were utilizing the crew’s 
day they put forth an initiative that garnered more production in seemingly less man-
hours. They altered the standard workweek. The new day would begin promptly at 0700 
and end at 1400. An integral part of the plan was to eliminate Quarters with the exception 
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of Wednesday and also the lunch break. This required crew buy-in and was achieved 
through the perception that they could choose between lunches or to be off every day at 
1400. What was observed was roughly six hours of productive work per crewmember. 
This workweek also seemed to increase morale, and coupled with the limited duty days 
per month, instilled greater job appreciation and increased retention. This was all done 
with 10 percent fewer sailors than the other ships in the same class.  
 
There have been no empirical studies of the ship’s readiness 
or performance, but Yorktown recently won the Golden Anchor 
Award for Personnel Retention and last year received the Battle ‘E’ 
Award for material condition. While the Yorktown M+l requirement is 
337 sailors, the average ship in the CG-47 class requires 358. (Moore and 
Hattiangadi 2002) 
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III. ALTERNATIVE WORKWEEKS 
When considering work-life balance outcomes it is useful to delineate two 
dimensions of working time arrangements: the volume and the schedule of 
the hours worked. The volume of hours worked clearly impacts on the 
amount of time that is left for other activities. But the manner in which 
hours are scheduled is also important for the quality of the fit with 
domestic schedules and wider social life rhythms Work schedules 
encompass both: the times when hours are worked, including exposure to 
non-standard work rhythms (working during the evening, at night, at 
weekends or on rotating shifts); and the type of flexibility, which includes 
fixed and predictable schedules, those that vary frequently according to 
the needs of the employer (employer-led flexibility) and those that offer 
some autonomy for workers to vary when they work, including working 
from home (employee-led flexibility).  
 
– Collette Fagan, “The Influence of Working Time Arrangements  
On Work-Life Integration or ‘Balance,’” 2011 
 
A. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The United States Navy seeks to find the right fit between its sailors and the 
commands to which they are assigned. Often times a sailors’ operational tempo is used to 
gauge the necessity for a shore billet. Taken as a whole career, and on an individual basis, 
it is easy for detailers to tailor the situation to the circumstances. While discussing work 
week calculations on a broader basis, and with no specific individual under scrutiny, it 
becomes difficult to find the right “groove” for an individual. The Navy has taken an 
approach utilizing averaging techniques in order to better understand and predict the 
useful product of a scheduled workweek. Because of these averaging techniques, a 
workweek calculation does not just represent the productive work for one week, but 
rather it encompasses the entire calendar for a month or year.   
The following theoretical calculations have been developed by applying the Navy 
Standard Workweek (NSW) assumptions found in OPNAVINST 1000.16K to proposed 
alternative workweeks. First, by applying the standard workweek assumptions to 
alternative workweeks allows for fewer days to be worked. While each week maintains 
the same number of scheduled hours, each work day in the alternative work week has a 
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higher volume of work per day. Next, shifting workweeks around holidays so as to not 
lose any production days the negative productive hours calculated in the NSW can be 
removed from the theoretical calculation. Finally, the key assumption is made. Because 
of the flexibility of the alternative workweeks presented, it is assumed that less leave will 
be taken because there are more Fridays and Mondays that are not scheduled. This 
assumption is equal to 20 percent of the total leave taken per year because there are now 
18 percent less work days in the year. This assumption is not founded in science but 
intuition and therefore the only issued numbers are those calculated with a full 
complement of leave taken per week. The overall assumption is that average weekly 
hours expressed in each NSW are guidelines for sustained personnel utilization. Losses 
due to Training, Service Diversion, Leave and Holidays for the basic NSW ashore are 
shown in Table 2. 
Training is an activity of an instructional nature, which contributes directly to 
combat readiness and deducts from the individual’s capability to do productive work. 
Training hours are factored to reflect those scheduled events (e.g., general drills, 
engineering casualty damage control) for all hands. Hours indicated have been 
standardized for Condition III in Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMD). 
Service Diversion consists of actions required of military personnel by regulations 
or the nature of shipboard/staff routine. Service Diversion includes, but is not limited to, 
the following types of activities:  Quarters, inspections, and sick call, other administrative 
requirements Commanding Officers Non-Judicial Punishment, participation on boards 
and committees, interviews, and non-training-related assemblies as well as flight and 
hangar-deck integrity watches. The months of February and November were analyzed 
due to their applicability in terms of working hours. February is the shortest month each 
year and also incorporates a Monday holiday in Presidents Day. November is a standard 
month in terms of length but consistently incorporates a mid-week holiday in the form of 
Thanksgiving. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if an alternate workweek can be 




calendar. A visual representation of the OPNAVINST 1000.16K NSW is shown in 
Tables 3 and 4 for a single service member during the months of February and November 
2014 while Figures 1 and 2 show a breakdown of those scheduled hours.   
 
 
Detailed Description of Navy Standard Workweek 
Aircraft Squadrons – Military Personnel 
Shore-Based Squadrons (e.g., FRS, HT, and VT) Where Accompanying Dependents  
are authorized: 
         
Total hours available weekly 
   
40.00 Hrs 
Routine is 8 hours per day, 5 days per week, excluding meal hours 
  
         Non-Available time 
      Training 
   
(1.47) Hrs   
Service Diversion 
   
(1.00) Hrs   
Leave 
   
(2.62) Hrs 
  Holidays 
   
(1.53) Hrs   
Total     
-6.62 
   
         Total Hours Available for Productive Work    33.38 Hrs 
    

















Navy Standard Workweek  
Feb-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Day Off 
Presidents 
Day Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28   
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68   
19 Workdays X 6.68 hrs productive work per day = 126.84 productive work hours in Feb 2014 
Table 3.   Navy Standard Workweek February 2014 
 











Navy Standard Workweek  
Nov-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Day Off Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Work 6.68 Thanksgiving 
CO’s 
Discretion Day Off 
30             
Day Off             
18 Workdays X 6.68 hrs productive work per day = 120.24 productive work hours in Nov 2014 
Table 4.   Navy Standard Workweek November 2014 












This chapter discusses a Four/Ten, Four/Ten Split and an employee driven 
Floating schedule as alternatives to the NSW and their associated benefits and 
drawbacks. The alternatives have been derived using Volume, Schedule and Flexibility, 
parameters set forth by the International Labor Organization. The first alternative is 
labeled the Four Ten and consists of ten hours per day, four days per week. The second 
alternative work week is labeled the floating work week where enlisted members choose 
their work schedule within a normal range of working hours. The third alternative is 
labeled the split work week and is comprised of one half of the squadron working a four 
day ten hour per day work week and the other half work a standard week. In the split 
workweek, the half of the squadron that works the four day ten hour per day work weeks 
alternates.   
(1) Volume. The three following alternatives are all standard full time, largely 
daytime and employer led working time arrangements. A standard full time work 
schedule as defined by the International Labor Organization is 36 to 48 hours of work per 
week. Alternatives to the standard full time schedule are: Long full-time (over 48 hours) 
as seen during the NSW at sea; reduced full time (30-35 hours); standard part time (20-30 
hours) and marginal part time (less than 20 hours). Due to the military requirements on 
commands, standard full time is the only feasible options for the following alternative 
with the caveat that Commanding Officers can always extend working hours or issue 
liberty early 
(2) Schedule. Largely daytime shifts means that the hours worked are 
generally during the daytime or there is no rotation of shifts. Data shows that exposure to 
nonstandard work rhythms can lead to fatigue, mental health issues and decreases self-
health assessment of workers (Fagan, “The Influence of Working Time Arrangements On 
Work-Life Integration or ‘Balance’: A Review of the International Evidence” 2012). The 
Navy is no stranger to non-standard work rhythms but the goal of this shift in work time 
arrangement is to increase the efficiency of workers and therefore nonstandard work 
rhythms have been avoided in the given alternatives.  
(3) Flexibility. The work hours in the following work week alternatives are 
employer led because the Commanding Officer always has the opportunity to change the 
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working hours by extending hours or issuing liberty early. Alternatives to employer led 
flexibility are employee led flexibility or fixed working hours. Due to the nature of most 
military work, there is a necessity for multiple personnel to be available to complete 
tasks. The schedule mismatch generated by employee led flexibility diminished the 
ability of organizations to complete tasks and is therefore infeasible. Fixed work hours 
are also infeasible because it limits the ability of the Commanding Officer to “surge” to 
complete tasks.  
a. Four/Ten 
The Four/Ten work week consists of four days per week and ten hours per day. 
The normal working days are Monday through Thursday. In weeks where there is a 
holiday that does not fall on a Friday the work week would shift to include Friday. In 
weeks where a holiday falls in the middle of the week such as July Fourth the day off and 
any extra time off would be at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.   A sample 
calendar for the months of February 2014 and November 2014 to illustrate the holiday 
workweek shift are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.  
The Four/Ten alternative work week can gain as much as 11 percent more 
productive work hours than the standard workweek because holidays are now no longer 
used in the calculation of productive work hours. As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 you 
can see the progression from the NSW to the proposed Four/Ten alternative workweeks 






Four/Ten using 33.38/week 
Feb-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day 
Off Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Day Off Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day 
Off Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Day Off Day Off 




Day Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28   
Day 
Off Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Work 8.34 Day Off   
16 Workdays X 8.34 hrs productive work per day = 133.44 productive work hours in Feb 
2014 
Table 5.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations using Four/Ten 
February 2014 
 














Four/Ten using 33.38- holidays 
Nov-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Day Off 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Thanksgiving 
CO’s 
Discretion Day Off 
30             
Day Off             
15 Workdays X 8.73 hrs productive work per day = 130.95 productive work hours in Nov 2014 
Table 6.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations without reduction for 
holidays using Four/Ten November 2014 
 
 
Figure 4.  Navy Standard Workweek calculations without reduction for 










b. Floating Workweek 
The floating workweek is the only employee led flexible schedule. During any 
given period of time an enlisted member could choose when they were at work. Each 
enlisted member would work 40 hours per week and could choose which days they 
wanted to have off. This alternative is similar to many attempts to increase job 
satisfaction in the civilian job marketplace. This alternative may provide all the benefits 
included with both of the other alternative workweeks as shown in Table 7 and Table 8 
along with Figure 5 and Figure 6.   
 
Floating using 33.38- holidays 
Feb-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day 
Off Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day 
Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Day Off 




Day Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28   
Day 
Off Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73   
16 Workdays X 8.73 hrs productive work per day = 139.68 productive work hours in Feb 
2014 
Table 7.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations using Floating Work 




Figure 5.  Navy Standard Workweek calculations using Floating Workweek 
February 2014 
Floating using 33.38- holidays 
Nov-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day 
Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day 
Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Work 8.73 Day Off 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Day 
Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Day 
Off Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Work 8.73 Thanksgiving 
CO’s 
Discretion Day Off 
30             
Day 
Off             
15 Workdays X 8.73 hrs productive work per day = 130.95  productive work hours in Nov 
2014 
Table 8.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations using Floating 













Figure 6.  Navy Standard Workweek calculations using Floating Workweek 
November 2014 
 
c. Four/Ten Split Alternative Workweek 
The four/ten split workweek would split the squadron into two teams with equal 
qualifications. The first team “Gold” would transition to a four/ten workweek in week 
one while the other half of the squadron “Blue” would execute a standard Navy five/eight 
workweek. In week two the Blue and Gold teams would alternate which workweek they 
operated and would continue the cycle throughout the calendar year. The effectiveness of 
this alternative workweek using the entire enlisted force of HSM 40 is shown in Table 9 

















Split using 33.38- holidays 
Feb-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day 
Off Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 3.4 Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day 
Off Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 3.4 Day Off 




Day Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28   
Day 
Off Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 7.65 Work 3.4   
16 Workdays X 7.65 hrs productive work per day + 3 Workdays X 3.4 hrs productive work 
per day = 132.6 productive work hours in Feb 2014 
Table 9.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations for February 2014 















Split using 33.38- holidays 
Nov-14 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
            1 
            Day Off 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Day 
Off Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 3.4 Day Off 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Day 
Off Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 3.4 Day Off 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Day 
Off Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 3.4 Day Off 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Day 
Off Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Work 7.765 Thanksgiving 
CO’s 
Discretion Day Off 
30             
Day 
Off             
15 Workdays X 7.77 hrs productive work per day + 3 Workdays X 3.4 hrs productive work 
per day = 130.075 productive work hours in Nov 2014 
Table 10.   Navy Standard Workweek calculations for November 2014 
without reduction for holidays applied to Four/Ten Split alternative 
workweek schedule 
B. ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. Gains in Productive Work Hours 
Overall when analyzing any alternative work time arrangement to the current 
Navy Standard work week there is a gain in total productive hours. A compilation of total 
productive work hours for all three alternatives and the current Navy Standard Work-




  Days Current 
Four / 
Ten Floating  Split 
February 19 128.25 139.68 139.68 132.6 
November  18 121.5 132.38 132.38 127.35 
            
Total 37 249.75 272.06 272.06 259.95 
Delta     22.31 22.31 10.2 




The four/ten alternative workweek would be effective at increasing the number of 
productive work hours per week because time lost working due to holidays is negated.     
b. Floating 
 The calculated increases in productive work hours are the same for the 
floating work week as they are for the four ten work week.  
c. Four/Ten Split 
Given that calculations of the four/ten alternative workweek yield a gain of 14 
hours per month the four/ten split alternative workweek will gain half that. The four/ten 
split workweek will also minimize the amount of time a squadron is unable to support 
other squadrons.   
3. Benefits–Schedule 
a. Four/Ten 
The transition to the four/ten provides the enlisted member with 52 more days off 
per year and may lead to more productive work or a higher retention rate. Studies found 
that as stress levels increase production goes down. Since time off is one of the many 
ways that the Navy combats stress, it is logical to say that decreased stress will increase 
productivity and overall job happiness. 
 23 
b. Floating 
 The benefits gained from a floating work week are not so easily 
quantifiable. The productivity of workers may increase due to the empowerment that they 
feel they have over their own work time arrangement.  
c. Four/Ten Split 
The Split work week is beneficial because it allows other organizations who rely 
on the command with the alternate work time arrangement to be serviced. Unlike the 
four/ten alternative schedule, the split work week schedule allows commands to remain 
fully functional on Fridays while only diminishing half their capacity to complete tasks.   
4. Benefits–Flexibility 
a. Four/Ten 
The Four/Ten alternative work time arrangement is beneficial because the hours 
are employer led with opportunities to be increased or decreased based on demand. This 
steady work time arrangement allows for workers to enrich their social lives because of 
the extra days granted using this alternative.   
b. Floating 
The benefits associated with the floating work week are difficult to calculate 
because there are no set days on which to calculate productive work forecast. Potential 
benefits to be considered are the organizational benefits that are associated with freedom 
to choose work hours and individual empowerment.   
c. Four/Ten Split 
This hybrid alternative work week will minimize perceived drawbacks associated 
with working four days per week and will maximize the efficiency gained from the 




Drawbacks to the four/ten are primarily external to the command. The interaction 
between commands is essential to the proper function of the military. The transition to 
the four day per week workweek also presents a challenge to commands that support 
seagoing commands that do not transition to the same alternative work week. In this 
situation the seagoing command may need support from an Aviation Intermediate 
Maintenance Depot (AIMD) on a Friday in order to maintain an underway schedule but 
find that AIMD does not conduct business on Fridays. 
b. Floating 
Drawbacks to the floating work week are minimized because there would be 
supervision of the hours scheduled for each worker. Supervisors would monitor the 
amount of hours workers scheduled and their relationship to task completion and adjust 
the desired schedule to benefit the command. 
c. Four/Ten Split 
The split work week also minimizes the drawbacks with a transition to an 
alternative work week because all days’ weekdays are work days’ with at least half the 
personnel required to be fully functional. Functionality of the command is not 
diminished; only capacity is decreased by half.  
6. Drawbacks–Schedule 
a. Four/Ten 
There are many changes from the current system that may be seen as drawbacks. 
When a Holiday shift is required due to Monday holidays there is a four day weekend 
provided. Under the current system 96 hour liberties are only authorized by O-6 and 
higher. If there were a shift to this alternative work week there would be a need to 
authorize Commanding Officers at all ranks the ability to authorize the necessary 96 
hours liberties.   
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b. Floating 
Drawbacks to a floating workweek include difficulties in scheduling meetings or 
training. Other drawbacks include the management of qualifications and the ensuing 
junior senior competition for the most desirable time off.   
c. Four/Ten Split 
The Split work week provides the greatest drawback to flexibility because there 
will be rotating work hours for the two halves of the squadron. This rotating schedule 
may lead to confusion but with careful attention from supervisors can be minimized.   
7. Drawbacks–Flexibility 
a. Four/Ten 
The four/ten alternative work time arrangement is the least flexible because it 
assumes that all workers are available four days a week. The gains from this alternative 
can be diminished by any worker requiring more flexibility to care for family or other 
tasks that are generally accommodated for. This loss in productive work time is increased 
because each day taken for personal reasons loses greater productive work hours.    
b. Floating 
 The floating work time arrangement is the most beneficial to workers in 
reference to flexibility but may be infeasible because of the nature of military tasks.   
c. Four/Ten Split 
Given that there is a division of force this alternative workweek will present 
challenges to leaders in deciding which members are assigned to different teams. A 
comparison of the NSW in terms of volume of work completed, flexibility, and the 
schedule conflicts of the proposed alternate workweeks is represented in Table 12. Green 
indicates an improvement in the category, yellow shows a marginal change either up or 
down and red indicates a loss in the category when compared to the NSW.   
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The volume is depicted as green in both the Four/Ten and the Split Four/Ten due 
to the demonstrated increased hours of productive work of 22.31 hours per month per 
sailor. The Floating alternative is yellow due to the smaller gain of 10.2 hours per month.  
Flexibility was determined to be diminished at the service member level in both 
Four/Ten proposals due to the more rigid requirements imposed by a four day workweek. 
This is due in part because any worker requiring more flexibility to say, care for family, 
would result in a loss in productive work time which is compounded each day 
compromised. The Floating alternative was found to be the most flexible at the member 
level by its very definition. 
In this table the schedule is depicted as it pertains to the command as a whole in 
such terms as meetings or command wide functions like a urinalysis sweep. Both of the 
Four/Ten alternatives presented marginal diminished returns due to the limited days per 
week the command personnel would be required to be present. The floating option 
presents significant problems in the scheduling category due to gains demonstrated in 
flexibility. Command meetings and high priority functions would require significant 
management under this alternative. 
The Floating Alternative Workweek seems to be the least desirable due to the 
relatively low increase in volume of work and the meticulous nature of the required 
management. Both Four/Ten alternatives offer a significant increase in the volume of 
work per service member and seem to offer sufficient flexibility to garner the required 
buy-in but will require a greater level of supervisory management in order to insure the 






This chapter introduced three alternative workweeks: Four/Ten, Four/Ten Split 
and Floating. It describes how each was examined using Volume, Schedule, and 
Flexibility and provides possible benefits and drawbacks for each parameter studied. 
 
 ALTERNATIVE WORKWEEKS 
Benefits Standard Work Week Four/Ten Floating Split 
Volume of Work 
Completed 
    
Flexibility 
    
Schedule 
    Table 12.   Stop light of Alternative Workweeks 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND FEASIBILITY 
A. IMPLEMENTING A NON-STANDARD WORKWEEK 
Before instituting or initiating a new standard workweek, it is imperative to 
diagnose the current organizational culture and rate the effectiveness of the current work 
schedule. Shifting an organization from one set of working hours to another is not merely 
as simple as putting up a new schedule. The schedule of work and process of how things 
are routinely accomplished are part of the culture and the inherent social norms. The 
Organizational Cultural Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is a research method based on 
the Competing Values Framework developed by Kim Cameron and Robert Quinn used to 
examine organizational culture and provides steps in which to change that culture. The 
OCAI is marketed as a tool for civilian institutions and firms that are looking to make 
cultural changes within the organization to meet new demands and shift external 
environments. The challenges facing the Navy are reduced budgets, personnel constraints 
and increasing requirements and amidst all these challenges the Navy must maintain its’ 
current readiness and meet future demands. A successful implementation of a non-
standard workweek and a cultural shift that combat these challenges at the unit level, may 
be the first step in reducing costs and increasing efficiency (OCAI 2010). 
“The Competing Values Framework was initially developed using research 
conducted on the major indicators of effective organization.” (Cameron and Quinn 2006)  
It utilizes indicators of organizational effectiveness that have been formatted in to two 
competing dimensions; flexibility and discretion versus stability and control and internal 
focus/integration versus external focus/differentiation. These two dimensions form four 
quadrants that represent what is valued in the organizations performance and define the 
core values and what is good, right and appropriate. The four quadrants of the competing 
values framework are Clan (collaborative), Adhocracy (creative), Hierarchy (control) and 
Market (competitive) as shown in Figure 7 (Cameron and Quinn 2006). 
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Figure 7.  Competing Values Framework 
The hierarchy culture is characterized as a structured work environment with rules 
and procedures that govern what people do and how they do it. Leaders are expected to 
be efficient and coordinating and organizing and maintaining a smooth running 
organization. Government/Department of Defense and large corporations are examples of 
typical hierarchy cultures. They value structure and many have multiple hierarchy layers 
of leadership. Hierarchy cultures are known for their controlling environments. 
The market culture is characterized by competition and a drive to win. Success in 
a market culture defined by gaining market share and increased profits and its leaders are 
expected to be hard-driving producers in and external environment with fierce 
competition. 
The clan culture is characterized by its’ sense of family and we-ness. In contrast 
to the hierarchy and market cultures, clan focuses on teamwork, employee involvement 
and corporate commitment to employees. Leaders can be viewed as mentors or even 
parents and the team succeeds or fails together.   
The adhocracy culture is just as the root word implies, temporary. They can be 
characterized by change and innovation. They are characterized by the ability to be 
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flexible, adaptable and creative. Leadership in the adhocracy culture is characterized as 
visionary, innovative and risk oriented. 
The OCAI if utilized properly can provide an organization with a true 
representation of where they are as a culture, where they would like to be and a realistic 
approach on how to get there. Things that must be considered when assessing the culture 
are the environment, external and internal, the constraints the organization must operate 
within, the requirements that an organization has with regard to productivity and how the 
organization is viewed by leadership as well as subordinate level personnel. If an 
organization looks to change its culture and move toward one quadrant to another, it must 
examine the availability of resources in which to make change. Resources come in the 
form of capital, time, personnel, leadership and innovative technology among others. The 
OCAI address’s an organizations culture and captures a snap shot of its core values. 
Understanding the culture through using this tool may possibly lend itself to a roadmap 
for change within that organization. 
1. Process 
Utilizing the OCAI and the competing values framework the Navy can adjust the 
nine-step process to meet the specific requirements and uniqueness of being a 
government entity. 
Step 1. Potential change recommendations and the OCAI process are briefed to 
the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and the Command Master Chief. Utilizing 
an outside or organic change agent, gather inputs from leadership and subordinates to 
determine what the current culture is, and evaluate the effectiveness of the current 
workweek. Every unit in the Navy, whether operational or support, has a core mission of 
supporting the war fighter or war effort directly or indirectly. Determine if the present 
culture and processes in place support this mission to the max extent possible.   
Step 2. Using the same inputs determine what the preferred future organizational 
culture looks like. Based on the challenges listed above what does the organization look 
like in the future to be highly successful?  How can we be the best that we’ve ever been 
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given the constraints on money and people? Evaluate what a proposed alternate 
workweek does to move our organization in that direction. 
Step 3. Determine what changes will and will not mean within the unit. By 
changing the workweek and ultimately the culture, what does that look like from a 
leadership position and from a subordinate position? A Navy unit has certain mandates 
and rules that allow it to function and maintain good order and discipline. It is paramount 
that any changes made do not jeopardize good order and discipline and maintain the 
established chain of command. 
Step 4. Identify a strategic action agenda. With the implementation of an alternate 
workweek, what processes and procedures can be or must be redesigned in order to 
facilitate change?  Determine if there are any additional resources that must be obtained 
in order to be successful and determine the immediate environmental factors unique to 
the unit or organization. Navy units range in size and location and are unique in their day-
to-day operations; therefore implementation must be tailored to the individual unit to 
meet the desired goals. Even though manning decisions are made from a centralized 
position, no two units have the same manning or interpersonal dynamics as another. 
Thus, no two units will have the same reaction to the implementation of a non-standard 
workweek and its accompanying culture shift.   
Step 5. Identify small wins. Although the Navy is predominantly a hierarchical 
culture, it will require buy in from the sailors, Chief Petty Officers and officer leadership 
if the alternate workweek is going to succeed. Most importantly the sailors will need to 
see small victories that show them the process is working and is beneficial to them as 
well as the unit. Determine what changes can be made to the physical environment that 
make the change more feasible and appealing. Focus on some of the easy things that can 
be changed and visible actions that give the impression of change. These may come in the 
form of visible calendars that accentuate the time off for sailors, posted maintenance 




Step 6. Identify leadership implications. One of the unique attributes about any 
Navy command is the fact that no one person remains in a position of leadership more 
than 33 months. Identifying a change leader may be difficult because of current manning 
practices. It is important to note that there are competencies which are required and help 
to implement change. The change agent can identify these competencies with the help of 
the leadership in place and devise a training plan to exemplify these traits for current and 
future leaders. 
Step 7. Identify metrics, measures and milestones to maintain accountability and 
track progress. The desired end state in this process is to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency. Budget expenditures on every level are tracked by the Navy comptroller and 
are an easy metric to validate the financial benefits of implemented changes. Efficiency is 
directly related to the particular mission of the unit. One example is a unit responsible for 
maintaining and flying aircraft and is required to sustain a particular state of readiness 
under a prescribed set of constraints such as people and money; then those metrics should 
be relatively simple to track as well.  
Step 8. Identify a communication strategy that is effective at informing all 
members of the organization of why and how the changes are going to be implemented. 
The Commanding Officer is responsible for communicating his vision and goals to the 
organization. The commanding officer is also responsible for utilizing all feedback to 
promulgate modifications to the change plan and gauge the level of buy in from all levels 
in the organization. Without effective communication up and down the chain of 
command there is no way to discern if the process is effective or not (Cameron and Quinn 
2006). 
B. FEASIBILITY AND CULTURE  
The monetary costs and additional resources appear feasible to implement an 
alternative workweek. An aviation command ashore cannot and will not be required to 
add additional personnel in order effect change; in fact, if the organization can continue 
the mission with the same or greater efficiency with fewer personnel it will provide 
statistical proof for a reduced footprint based on the alternate workweek. Should the 
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alternate workweek produce less than expected results or a cultural change that is adverse 
to the mission requirements of the unit, little or no effort is required to revert to the 
standard workweek. What may not be feasible is the possible second and third order 
affects felt by supporting or subordinate commands. No one organization in the Navy is a 
stand-alone unit. Every organization is either responsible for supporting multiple 
subordinate units or shares responsibilities and mission requirements with similar units. 
By altering the culture and workweek of one unit alone, it could shift short-term 
responsibilities and leave gaps that may not be accounted for until all similar units 
incorporate a similar change process. 
There are multiple possible reasons for resistance and failure when implementing 
the alternate workweek. The first being, the Navy is not only steeped in tradition but like 
any other large organization, the culture and social norms have taken many years and 
generations to develop what they are today. The Navy can be broken down into warfare 
areas i.e., surface, aviation, sub-surface etc., and then even further as you get down to 
specific units. A destroyer is significantly different in culture, operations and schedule 
from an aircraft carrier and a jet squadron differs dramatically from a helicopter squadron 
in the same regards. Each one of these specific units has built its’ processes and “way of 
doing business” over many years with inputs from sailor’s, Chiefs and Officers and 
regulations put in place by big Navy. Every Ship and every Squadron has its’ unique way 
in which it does things and most of the sailors, particularly senior ones have known and 
learned those processes and business techniques over a long period of time. When an 
individual transfers from one unit to another, they are expected to adapt to the new units 
way of doing business. Professor John Kotter has outlined several reasons why 
organizations fail to change in the midst of actively trying to do so. Kotter outlines eight 
specific reasons, several of which are relevant to the Navy or any other government 
organization (Kotter 2007). 
(1) Not establishing a sense of urgency is the first error leaders can make 
when trying to create change. Although the change or changes are not always 
monumental, if urgency is not established by the leadership, it is almost impossible to get 
the organization to follow. Without urgency and motivation sailors and other members of 
 34 
the organization are going to remain with the status quo. The Chiefs mess is a strong and 
necessary leadership group within an organization but without prompting it will be 
difficult to drive them out of their comfort zone of what has “always worked.”   
(2) Not creating a powerful enough coalition within and outside of the 
organization to promote change. Every Commanding Officer in the Navy has a reporting 
senior as well as others that report to them. Not only is it paramount to recruit the support 
of those within the organization but those in organizations that you support and support 
you so they don’t feel abandoned when the processes they are accustomed to change. 
(3) Lack of vision. Senior leadership must understand the current organization 
and have a specific vision of what the organization should look like after the 
transformation. This vision must be simply stated and understood by all members of the 
organization. Each member must understand their role and the intended end state or goal. 
(4) Although sailors have sworn under oath to follow the orders of the 
Officers appointed over them; for any significant schedule or cultural change to be 
effective it will require buy in from the sailors on the deck plates. By instituting a plan 
that shows small wins for the sailors in the early stages of change, the organization 
increases its’ chances to be successful. As stated earlier, some of those small wins will 
come in the form of a less demanding work schedule and incentivized time off.  
(5) The new changes and the new work schedule must be institutionalized to 
ensure they continue to become the new culture and the new process. If the changes only 
appear to be the smoke and mirror of the “new” Commanding Officer, the old culture and 
the old ways of doing business are likely to take over again. 
(6) There are many factors to examine when determining when or if to 
institute cultural or schedule changes within an organization. The OCAI and the factors 
listed by Prof. Kotter provide us the tools to determine how and when to implement those 
changes and how to gauge the effectiveness of those changes (Kotter 2007). 
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C. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the background of the OCAI and a brief discussion of the 
Competing Values Framework by Cameron and Quinn and associated research. The 
Navy is an extremely large and diverse organization with multiple cultures and sub-
cultures. The OCAI may be a valuable tool to use the unit level as the Navy attempts to 
change culture and increase its organizational efficiency. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY  
Currently the United States Navy provides Commanding Officers a large amount 
of discretion on the day to day operations within their commands. No hard requirement 
exists for daily routines; therefor culture is the driver of current business practices 
regarding the workday. Chapters I through III provide a brief background on the United 
States Navy’s interest in increasing output and efficiency while maintaining or increasing 
a higher standard of living and increased morale amongst its’ sailors. This project 
examined the current Navy Standard Workweek (NSW) and three alternatives that may 
increase organizational effectiveness and efficiency while maintaining or increasing 
work-life standards for personnel in a Navy shore-based unit. The three alternatives were 
developed based on the same assumptions used in the formulation of the Navy Standard 
Workweek per the OPNAVINST 1000.16K. They were each evaluated on changes in 
work productivity, flexibility and schedule compared to the standard. This provided a list 
of viable alternatives for future implementation. The feasibility of implementing one of 
the alternative workweeks as well as providing a process to do so and possible challenges 
that may be encountered is outlined in Chapter IV. It examined how the culture must be 
assessed in order to understand where the organization is and desires to be in the future. 
This project provides follow on recommendations for future studies and implementation 
of an alternate workweek. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Can productive work be increased by altering the Navy Standard 
 Workweek? 
a. Conclusion 
After thorough examination, there is a high probability that the implementation of 
an alternate workweek will provide some gains in productive work. This increase may 
result in cost savings, organizational gains in professionalism of the work force and 
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retention of quality personnel. These benefits are sought after by private industry and 
should also be a focus of the United States Navy. 
b. Recommendation 
The researchers recommend that Naval leadership implement the Four/Ten Split 
alternate workweek at a shore based activities as appropriate. This will increase volume 
of work while maximizing coverage of the standard calendar workweek.  
2. How can the alternate workweek be implemented? 
a. Conclusion 
An alternate workweek has not been implemented to determine the actual gains 
and losses or define metrics used to gauge increased productive work.  
b. Recommendation 
It is recommended that alternative workweek execution be addressed at 
Perspective Commanding Officer/Prospective Executive Officer courses. Additional 
recommendations are to implement an efficiency monitoring program at a shore squadron 
or ashore activity.     
3. Can implementing an alternative workweek increase productive 
 work and improve retention with minimal culture change? 
a. Conclusion 
Changes in culture generally start with senior leadership. Formulating a plan for 
change in order to gain buy-in from the Chiefs Mess and deck plate through an alternate 
workweek could be implemented with moderate cultural change.  
b. Recommendation 
Before altering any work schedules or making any significant changes, the 
Organizational Cultural Assessment Instrument (OCAI) should be utilized by an 
independent agent, preferably another NPS graduate student, to assess the current culture 
and rate the feasibility of change within the designated organization. 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Conduct further research using OCAI to assess the current culture of a proposed 
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